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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
The caption on Plaintiffs' Brief is not correct because it lists Jeanette R. Lynton 
as a Defendant and does not list all the Defendants named by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint1 included additional parties. 
As a result of the trial court's ruling by Order dated 9/8/942, that DOT 
Adventures, Inc., was a valid corporation. The District Court directed that Jeanette 
R. Lynton be dismissed from the case and that her name be deleted from the caption. 
Consequently, the caption of the case should read as follows: 




DOT Adventures, Inc., Miguelangel Esquivel, Maria "Cookie" Reyes, 
Humberto Hernandez, 
Defendants. 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R107-99 
Exhibit 2, Order filed September 9,1994, R 304-303 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
§78-2-2(3)(j). Under §78-2a-3(2)(k), the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to 
transfer from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court commit reversible error when it granted 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dismissing the action against Jeanette 
R. Lynton, an individual? 
2. Did the District Court commit reversible error when it granted 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment dismissing the action against all the 
Defendants? 
In reviewing any order granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeals is 
to view facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
judgment, giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions,3 and the Court 
of Appeals is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions.4 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
§16-10A-1502(6): 
The failure of a foreign corporation to have authority to transact 
business in this state does not impair the validity of its corporate acts, 
nor does the failure prevent the corporation from defending any 
proceeding in this state. [Emphasis added] 
Pratt By and Through Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991). 
G.G.A., Inc., v. Levenhs, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This entire action arises out of a single incident which occurred on or about 
December 16,1992, at the work place of Plaintiffs and the corporate Defendant DOT 
Adventures, Inc. (hereinafter "DOT"). On or about that date, an employee had 
reported that $20.00 was missing from her purse. Miguelangel Esquivel (hereinafter 
"Esquivel"), DOT's plant manager, asked the employees of DOT, possibly 50 in 
number, including the four Plaintiffs, to submit to an individual check or search of 
their persons. Following the checking or searching, the employees went back to 
work. At the time, none of the employees objected to being checked or searched. 
No objection or complaint was made by anyone until Plaintiffs filed this action. 
Some nine months later, after all Plaintiff had obtained other, higher paying, 
jobs with other companies, Plaintiffs filed this action, claiming that during the t ime 
of their employment, specifically on or about December 16th, 1992, Plaintiffs had a 
cause of action which arose from the checking or searching process. 
Plaintiffs7 Amended Complaint alleged that Plaintiffs had causes of action 
against all Defendants for: wrongful detention; assault; battery; false imprisonment ; 
intentional and reckless infliction of emotional distress; intrusion into physical 
privacy; intrusion into personal belongings; and intrusion into personal affairs. 
As to Jeanette R. Lynton (hereinafter "Lynton"), Plaintiffs alleged that Lynton 
was personally liable because she was a stockholder, officer and director or DOT. 
Lynton was not present during the checking or searching and had no knowledge of 
it until some time later. 
2 
Plaintiffs7 action against Lynton rested upon a theory that since DOT, a 
Nevada Corporation had not obtained a Certificate Of Authorization from the Utah 
Division of Corporations to do business in Utah until January 5, 1993, the Nevada 
corporation doing business in Utah had somehow lost its corporate status, leaving 
Lynton as a sole proprietor, personally liability for all debts and actions against the 
company or any of its agents. 
Plaintiffs sought to have the trial court rule, as a matter of law, that a foreign 
corporation loses its corporate status when it begins doing business in Utah without 
first obtaining a Certificate Of Authorization from the Utah Division of 
Corporations and that Lynton therefore became personally liable, as a matter of law. 
Rejecting Plaintiffs7 argument, on September 8, 1994, the District Court 
granted Partial Summary Judgment5, dismissing Jeanette R. Lynton from the case. 
Completing discovery, Defendants moved for Summary Judgment, supported 
by Memorandum. At the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the trial court tried to 
explain to Plaintiffs7 counsel the nature of the elements required to establish the 
alleged causes of action, stating that the court, not observing any question of 
material fact, and, viewing the allegations in light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, 
could not see how the matter could go forward. The trial court made the 
observation that, even if Plaintiffs7 were able to establish facts sufficient to sustain all 
of their allegations, there would still be a questions of damages. "Where are your 
damages?77 For a detailed account from the record, please reffer to "Addendum A77, 
Exhibit 2, Order filed September 9,1994, R 304-303 
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Even then, declining to dismiss the case at that point, the trial court granted 
Plaintiffs an additional thirty (30) days to show that they could produce evidence to 
meet the elements of their multiple allegations, including any admissible evidence 
supporting their claim of having sufferred severe emotional injury damages. 
Plaintiffs filed additional documents to which the Defendants responded as a 
matter of law. Without requiring further hearing, the District Court granted 
Summary Judgment6 dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint against all the remaining 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Parties. 
1. The Defendant, DOT Adventures, Inc., (hereinafter "DOT"), is a 
Nevada corporation qualified to do business in Utah.7 
2. On January 5, 1993, DOT Adventures, a Nevada corporation, obtained 
formal authority from the Utah Division of Corporations to transact business in the 
state of Utah under the name of "DOT Adventures, Inc."8 
3. The Defendants, Miguelangel Esquivel (hereinafter "Esquivel"), Marie 
Reyes (hereinafter "Reyes") and Humberto Hernandez (hereinafter "Hernandez"), 
were employed by DOT, working at the manufacturing plant (hereinafter "Plant") in 
Orem, Utah. 
4. Esquivel, was the Plant Manager.9 His duties required him to oversee 
and efficiently manage the ongoing daily manufacture and shipment of DOT 
products. 
6
 Exhibit 3, Order filed July 14,1995, R 703-701 
4 
5. Reyes, and Hernandez were supervisors, acting under the authority 
and direction of Esquivel.10 
6. The Plaintiffs, Walter Semidey (hereinafter "Semidey"), Angel 
Santiago (hereinafter "Santiago"), Humberto Bardales (hereinafter "Bardales"), and 
Mazariegos (hereinafter "Mazariegos"), were employed by DOT, working at the 
Plant. The Plaintiff's salary checks were all drawn under the name of DOT 
Adventures, Inc.11 
7. DOT's business is the design, manufacture and marketing of a large 
variety of small rubber stamps used by purchasers to decorate personal 
communications. The manufacture and shipment of such rubber stamps is 
accomplished at the Plant. 
The incident. 
8. For cause of action, the Plaintiffs' have alleged that on December 16 or 
17 of the year 1992 (hereinafter "December 16, 1992"), at the Defendant's Plant in 
Orem, the following events occurred: 
a. At approximately 10:00 a.m., Esquivel gave instructions 
that work at the Plant was to stop and that all employees were to gather 
to the lunch area.12 
Exhibit 4, Certified Copy of the Certificate of Authority and Certificate of Corporate Status, R 231-229 
Exhibit 4, Certified Copy of the Certificate of Authority and Certificate of Corporate Status, R 231-229 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R107-99, at R 106, para. 6 
Exhibit 1 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R106, para 8, 
and R 105, para 10 
Exhibit 5, Affidavit of Bryant Lancaster, CPA, filed May 31,1994, R 85-79, at R 82-79 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R107-99, at R105, para 16 
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b. At the lunch area, Esquivel told everyone present that he 
had received information that twenty dollars ($20.00) had been stolen 
from a purse of one of the Plant workers.13 
c. At the lunch area,14 Esquivel gave directions to the 
supervisors that all employees would be checked or searched.15 
d. Esquivel stated that if anyone objected, he or she was to 
indicate that objection or raise their hand. No person objected. No 
person raised their hand.16 
e. Esquivel instructed all male employees to individually, 
one at a time, go to the men's room with Hernandez. The female 
employees were to go to the women's room with Reyes (a female 
supervisor).17 
f. The male Plaintiffs report that in the rest room they were 
asked to show their pockets, wallets and the inside of their shoes.18 
g. While she admits that none of her clothing was removed, 
the Plaintiff female employee, Mazariegos, alleges that she was also 
asked to loosen her bra and that Reyes (the female supervisor) touched 
her by running her fingers along and inside the lower line of her bra.19 
Mazariegos did not say at that time that she objected to the procedure 
or the alleged touching. 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 105, para 17 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 15 lines 16-18 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 17 lines 2-
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 17, lines 14-17 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 18, lines 6-24 
Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, pg. 42, lines 12-13 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, page 23, lines 7-19 
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h. No other person has described any touching similar to 
that described by Mazariegos, and none is alleged. 
i. Semidey testified that he believed that if the incident had 
been ordered by the police, it would have been lawful.20 
j . After the checking was completed, Esquivel told everyone 
to go back to work. Everyone went back to work.21 
k. No stolen money was found. 
9. Although the Plaintiff Mazariegos claims that the Plaintiffs were told 
that no one was to leave,22 no door was locked or barred.23 
10. The Plaintiff Bardales, testified in his deposition that no one stated that 
he would be prohibited from leaving.24 
11. None of the Plaintiffs made any attempt to leave.25 None were 
restrained. No guard was posted. No physical show of force or restraint was 
demonstrated.26 
12. There is no evidence or testimony that there was any showing of 
restraint or an indication that it would be used to prevent anyone from leaving. 
13. There is no evidence or testimony that there was any force used. There 
is no evidence or testimony that any physical pain was caused to any of the 
Plaintiffs. 
20
 Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, pg 35, lines 3-6 
21
 Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg 20, lines 3-
22
 Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, page 28, lines 13-16 
23
 Exhibit 21, Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, dated April 21,1994, pg 42, lines 11-13 
24
 Exhibit 21, Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, dated April 21,1994, pg 42, lines 14-18 
25
 Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg 28, lines 13-16 
26
 Exhibit 21 Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, pg 42, lines 14-18, and, Exhibit 6 Memorandum Decision 
filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685 at R 688, paragraph 17 
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14. There is no evidence or testimony that the supervisors' checking was 
performed with anger. 
15. There is no evidence or testimony that any of the Plaintiffs had any 
fear that they would be injured in any way. There is no evidence or testimony that 
there was any reason to fear injury. There is no evidence or testimony that any 
injury was intended.27 
The Plaintiffs motivation for filing the action. 
16. The Plaintiff Semidey, described his reason or motivation for the filing 
of the complaint. He said: "The sole reason for us being here is the feeling of offense 
as a result of this conduct, meaning the search incident."28 
There was no notice to Defendants of any claim. 
17. Until the Complaint was filed with the Court, no Plaintiff objected 
about the incident to any DOT supervisor or officer. 
18. No objection was received by DOT until the Complaint was filed more 
than nine months after the incident. 
Proceedings in the trial court - first Motion For Summary Judgment. 
19. On July 11, 1994, Defendants filed a Motion For Summary Judgment, 
asking the Court to dismiss the action against Defendant Lynton personally, because 
DOT was a Nevada corporation and Lynton was not personally liable for the 
corporate actions of DOT.29 The Motion was supported by a Memorandum.30 
27
 Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, para. 16, and Exhibit 22, 
Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg. 40, lines 3-7 
28
 Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, page 59, lines 14-17 
29
 Exhibit 7, Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike, filed July 11,1994, R138-136 
30
 Exhibit 8, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike filed July 11,1994, 
R 127-119 
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20. The Plaintiffs filed their response to the motion under the caption of 
Plaintiffs' Objection To Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment.31 
21. Plaintiffs' response claimed that there were disputed issues of fact, but 
the response did not raise any issues of fact by reference to any sworn testimony or 
admissible evidence.32 
22. In reality, Plaintiffs' response merely argued that "DOT Adventures," a 
Nevada Corporation, which qualified to do business in Utah under the name "DOT 
Adventures, Inc." is not be the same corporation because the word "Inc." was added 
to the end of the name on the Utah Certificate of Authority.33 
23. Plaintiffs' response admitted the existence of the Nevada Corporation 
"DOT Adventures," and attached a copy of the Nevada Certificate of Corporate 
Status to Plaintiffs' response.34 
24. Defendants Reply Memorandum In Support Of Defendant Lynton's 
Motion For Summary Judgment,35 provided certified copies of official documents 
from the State of Nevada and the State of Utah demonstrating that the Utah 
Certificate Of Authority,36 was issued based upon the application filed by DOT 
Exhibit 9, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 19,1994, 
R 218-178 
Exhibit 9, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 19,1994, 
R 218-178 
Exhibit 9, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 19,1994, 
R 218-178, at R 218-215 
Exhibit 9, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Lynton's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 19,1994, 
R 218-178 at R 199-198 
Exhibit 10, Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Lynton's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed August 8,1994, R 252-229 
Exhibit 4, Certified Copy of the Certificate of Authority and Certificate of Corporate Status, R 231-229, at 
R 231 
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Adventures, a Nevada Corporation.37 Utah laws38 require inclusion of "Inc.", 
Nevada law39 does not. Appellants7 entire case against Ms. Lynton personally, relied 
solely upon Appellants most unique double or two corporation theory. Before the 
trial court, Appellants vigerously argued that there were two corporations, one of 
which was DOT Adventrues, Inc., (a Utah corporation) and the other of which was 
DOT Adventures (a Nevada corporation). Appellants never produced any evidence 
in law or fact as to the "Inc." 
25. Based upon certified copies of the Utah Certificate Of Authority and its 
underlying application, which documents were not disputed, the trial court 
concluded, that "DOT Adventures," a Nevada Corporation, had qualified to do 
business in Utah under the name "DOT Adventures, Inc.," as required by Utah law, 
and that under the provisions of §16-10A-1502(6), UCA, a foreign corporation does 
not lose its corporate status by doing business prior to receipt of the Utah Certificate 
Of Authority. 
26. The trial court also concluded, as a matter of law, that the Defendant 
Lynton, knowing nothing of the incident and not being present at the time of the 
incident, had no part in the alleged incident and that she was not personally liable 
merely because she was a stockholder, officer and/or director of the corporation. 
Exhibit 4, Certified Copy of the Certificate of Authority and Certificate of Corporate Status, R 231-229, at 
R 230 
Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-401, The name of a corporation: (a) must contain the word "corporation," or 
"company," or the abbreviation "corp." "inc.," or "co.," or words or abbreviations of like import in another 
language. 
See: Nevada Corporation Law, §§78.039 through 78.045. It is impossible to prove a negitive. No Nevada law 
requires the use of "Inc." in the name of any corporation. Appellants have not shown and are unable to base 
any double or two corporation theory upon such an argument. Appellants have produced no evidence 
otherwise. 
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The trial court granted a partial summary judgment, dismissing the action against 
Defendant Lynton personally.40 
Proceedings in the trial court - Defendant's second Motion For Summary judgment. 
27. On October 11,1994, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 
as to all remaining issues and as to all the remaining Defendants. The Motion was 
supported by a memorandum.41 
28. In Plaintiffs' response, entitled Objection to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated 11/1/94,42 Plaintiffs provided a so-called "Statement Of 
Disputed Facts," but the Plaintiffs' statement did not provide any testimony to 
contest Defendants' recitation of facts, and it did not dispute the material facts 
recited by Defendant's Memorandum.43 
29. Plaintiffs' response did not comply in any respect with Rule 4-501(2)(b) 
Code Of Judicial Administration. There is not one single reference in Defendant's 
Response to any paragraph contained in Defendants' Statement Of Facts.44 
30. Plaintiffs' response relied upon affidavits which contain summaries of 
hearsay conversations, without foundation. As an example, Plaintiffs argue in their 
statement of facts that Esquivel demanded the search as a "deliberate and calculated 
insult . . . , "45 but Plaintiffs do not support the hearsay conclusion with admissible 
testimony. In the next paragraph of Plaintiff's so-called statement of facts, Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 2, Order filed September 9,1994, R 304-303, and Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10, 
1995, R 757-789, at R 750-751, lines 4-17 
Exhibit 11, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment - Failure to State Cause of 
Action, filed October 13, 1994, R 341-315 
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344 at R 418-399 
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344 at R 418-413 
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344 at R 418-413 
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344, at R 414 
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argue, in the alternative, that if the statement is not true, the following alternative 
statement is true: 
18. In the alternative, Mr. Esquivel acted in deliberate and 
intentional disregard of the emotional distress and humiliation caused 
by his insulting behavior ... .46 
31. The statement made in paragraph 18 quoted above is not supported by 
reference to sworn testimony or evidence. 
32. Plaintiffs memorandum did not provide the court with evidence or 
testimony to demonstrate that there were any issues of fact. The m e m o r a n d u m 
merely argued Plaintiffs' position. 
33. Plaintiffs' memorandum could have alleged that all the Plaintiffs were 
touched during the alleged search, but Plaintiffs' statement of facts does not claim 
they all were touched. To the contrary, Plaintiffs' Memorandum admits: 
20. The male supervisor did not physically touch most of the 
male workers.47 
34. There were numerous male workers at the Plant. Only three of those 
male workers have joined in this action. 
35. Plaintiffs' memorandum does not allege that Santiago (one of the male 
plaintiffs) was touched. Santiago's supporting affidavit does not claim that he was 
touched.48 
36. Plaintiffs' memorandum does allege that Mazariegos, the only female 
Plaintiff was touched. While the Memorandum alleges that each female was 
touched by the female supervisor, there is no support for the claim. The only 
46
 Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants7 Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344, at R 414 
47
 Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344, at R 414 
48
 Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344, at Santiago Affidavit, R 374-372 
12 
affidavit signed by a female which alleges a female was touched is the Mazariegos 
affidavit which states: 
When it was my turn to enter the bathroom the supervisor made m e 
unbutton my pants and loosen my blouse. She also made me undo my 
bra. Then she stuck her hands under my blouse and ran her hands all 
over the area of my waist and even under my bra. Then she told me to 
take off my shoes and socks, and to roll my pants legs up above my 
knees. Last of all, she stuck a pencil in my hair and searched through 
all my hair with a pencil.49 
37. Plaintiffs' memorandum admits that not one of the factory workers 
raised their hands to object to the check or search.50 
38. Plaintiffs' memorandum argues that the Plaintiffs did not consent to 
the check or to the search, but they nonetheless permitted it to happen due to fear.51 
39. Plaintiffs' memorandum does not demonstrate that any of the 
Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress or any specific injury. 
40. The Mazariegos affidavit contains nothing more than a summary or 
conclusion that Mazariegos, although she continued employment with DOT, 
couldn't work after the incident.52 
41. At the hearing on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
held on February 10, 1995,53 the trial court expressed concern that Plaintiffs' 
memorandum did not raise any issues of fact and that the trial court repeatedly 
asked Plaintiffs' counsel to tell the trial court what evidence she had to support the 
basic elements of her allegations. 
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344, at Mazariegos Affidavit, R 382-379 
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344, at R 415, para 14 
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344, at R 413, para 23 
Exhibit 12, Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed November 1,1994, R 418-
344, at Mazariegos Affidavit, R 382-379 
Exhibit 24, Hearing Transcript dated February 10,1995, R 757-789, beginning at 776 
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42. At the hearing, the trial court advised Plaintiffs' counsel that she had 
not provided sufficient evidence of the individual elements of proof required to 
establish a prima facie case, as to the various causes of action alleged by Plaintiffs, 
and if Plaintiffs did not provide the minimum evidence required, as to each 
element of proof required to establish a prima facie case, the trial court would have 
to grant Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. 
43. In Addendum "A" attached hereto, the Defendants have provided a 
synopsis of the conversation between the trial court and Plaintiff's counsel, whereby 
the trial court attempted to educate Plaintiff's counsel and explain to her what she 
would have to establish in order to avoid having the various causes of action 
dismissed. The trial court went through virtually every cause of action and 
reiterated every element of proof required in an effort to assist Plaintiffs' counsel. 
44. The court entered an Interim Order dated 2/24/95 granting the 
Plaintiffs additional time within which to present sufficient facts and/or testimony 
necessary to defeat Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment.54 The Order 
provided, among other things: 
1. The Court grants Plaintiffs until March 13, 1995, to show 
any basis they may have as to why this matter should continue, and 
that full Summary Judgment as requested by Defendants should not be 
granted as to all remaining alleged causes of action. As a m i n i m u m , 
Plaintiff shall provide the following: 
a) a list of witnesses for trial and a proffer as to what each 
witness will say, including the specifics as to what they 
will say about their damages, along with supporting 
corroboration or expert witnesses, if any; 
b) any tangible evidence that would support Plaintiff's 
claim for damages; and 
c) any appropriate testimony to be presented at trial.55 
Exhibit 25, Interim Order Regarding Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed February 24,1995, 
R 476-474 
Exhibit 25, Interim Order Regarding Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed February 24,1995, 
R 476-474 
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45. As permitted by the Trial Court's Order, Plaintiffs submitted additional 
documents.56 The additional documents submitted by the Plaintiffs consisted of the 
following: 
a. A Memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion57, entitled 
Plaintiffs' Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed March 13, 1995 and did not provide any additional 
testimony or evidence. The Plaintiff also filed an additional 
memorandum entitled Plaintiffs' (Amended) Second Objection to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 1995. 
This memorandum did not provide any additional testimony or 
evidence. 
b. A psychological opinion regarding all the Plaintiffs, contained in 
one letter from a Juan A. Mejia, who interviewed all the Plaintiffs, 
one by one, on February 18-19, 1995, more than two years after the 
alleged incident.58 
c. An affidavit of Linda J. Gummow who apparently did not 
interview any of the Plaintiffs, but who stated, in her affidavit, that 
she reviewed the opinion of Juan A. Mejia and she reviewed an 
"English translation of statements of the ... individuals." The 
statements were not attached to the affidavit.59 
Exhibit 14, Plaintiffs' Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 13,1995, 
R 513-477 and Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed March 23, 1995, R 604-544 
Exhibit 14, Plaintiffs' Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 13,1995, 
R 513-477 
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 
23, 1995, R 604-544 at The Psychological Evaluation of Juan A. Mejia, MD, at R 582-573 
Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 
1995, R 604-544 at The Affidavit of Linda J. Gummow, R 572-570 
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d. Copies of Amended English translations of Plaintiffs' affidavits 
which were originally before the trial court and which the trial 
court had already concluded were insufficient.60 
46. Defendants' filed a Motion to Strike and /or to Disregard Portions of the 
newly presented Plaintiffs' Affidavits.61 The Motion was supported by a 
Memorandum. 6 2 
47. As Defendant's Memorandum demonstrated, the amended 
translations of the affidavits submitted by the individual Plaintiffs contained 
statements which contradicted the Plaintiffs' prior sworn deposition testimony and 
rather than creating an issue of fact, the Plaintiffs' affidavits merely demonstrated 
that the individual Plaintiffs had made contradictory statements about the events.63 
The amended translations did not provide any additional information which 
demonstrated that genuine issues of fact precluded the granting of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment.64 
48. The Defendants responded by submitting what amounted to their reply 
memorandum to the supplemental responses provided by Plaintiffs.65 
49. The trial court then issued a detailed Memorandum Decision dated 
5/22/95 in which the trial court analyzed each cause of action asserted by Plaintiffs, 
and each essential element of a prima facie case which Plaintiffs would have to 
demonstrate, as to each cause of action, and the trial court determined that the 
Plaintiffs had failed to provide admissible testimony or evidence to support one or 
60
 Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 
1995, R 604-544 at the English Translations of Affidavits, R 567-545 
61
 Exhibit 16, Defendants' Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 
1995, R 630-629 
62
 Exhibit 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 1995, R 628-618 
63
 Exhibit 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 1995, R 628-618, at R 626-621 
64
 Exhibit 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 1995, R 628-618, at R 620-618 
65
 Exhibit 18, Reply to Plaintiffs' Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 3, 
1995, R 617-606 
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more of the essential elements of each cause of action and so there was no basis 
upon which the Court could deny Summary Judgment and require a trial.66 
50. On July 14, 1995, the court signed its Order dismissing the case.67 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
DOT was and is a Nevada corporation, in good standing, doing business in 
Utah. While DOT did not obtain its Certificate Of Authority from the Utah Division 
Of Corporations until two weeks after the incident which is the subject matter of 
this action, DOT nonetheless was a corporation and the stockholders, officers and 
directors of the corporation were not personally liable for the obligations and/or 
debts of the corporation. 
The trial court was correct in determining that Lynton, as a stockholder, 
officers and director was not personally liable to the Plaintiffs for the alleged actions 
of Esquivel, the plant manager. 
Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they had admissible testimony or 
evidence which could establish each essential element required to present a prima 
facie case, in regard to each cause of action, at trial. 
In addition, Plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of a material fact which would 
preclude the trial court from granting Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AND FOURTH CAUSES OF 
ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Unlawful detention, a criminal offense, is not the basis for a civil cause of action. 
The Utah Code Ann. §76-5-304 provides as follows: 
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685 
Exhibit 3, Order filed July 14,1995, R 703-701 
17 
(1) A person commits unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains 
another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his 
liberty. 
(2) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. 
"Unlawful Detention," under the Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-304, is a crime, 
but the Utah Criminal Code does not establish a civil liability or a civil penalty. In 
order to establish "false imprisonment" a person must demonstrate that force or the 
threat of force coupled with a reasonable apprehension of the use of force were 
utilized to detain or restrain the person. 
In Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962), a claim of malicious 
prosecution was made against a Deputy Sheriff, who, armed with a warrant of arrest 
for one person, mistakenly took another into custody and drove away with him in 
the officer's car. In reviewing a directed verdict of no cause of action, the Utah 
Supreme Court equated false imprisonment with unlawful detention and stated: 
Nevertheless, false imprisonment occurs whenever there is an 
unlawful detention or restraint of another against his will. 
(Id. at 459.) 
In Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P.2d 507, the 
Utah Supreme Court said: 
We wish to invite attention to a distinction in the law which we 
believe has been confused in the briefs. False arrest may be committed 
only by one who has legal authority to arrest or who has pretended 
legal authority to arrest. False imprisonment may be committed by 
anyone who imprisons without a legal right 
"Any exercise of force, or express or implied threat of force, by 
which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to 
remain where he does not wish to remain or go where he does not 
wish to go, is an imprisonment. * * * The essential thing is the 
restraint of the person. * * * If the words or conduct are such as to 
induce a reasonable apprehension of force, and the means of coercion 
are at hand, a person may be as effectually restrained and deprived of 
liberty as by prison bars. * * *" 11 R.C.L. 793, 794, sec. 5. 
(Id. at 509.) 
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In order for the restraint to be "unlawful", the restraint must be imposed with 
force or with the threat of force coupled with a reasonable apprehension that force 
will be used if the person being restrained does not comply. 
Plaintiffs' Brief relies upon and cites Hepworth,68 and argues that "there was 
no evidence or force, other than the authority of the floorwalkers and their police 
uniforms."69 However, in Hepworth, a city police officer, in uniform searched 
Hepworth, arrested Hepworth and told him that if he didn't accompany the police 
officer and cooperate, the police officer would take Hepworth to the police station to 
book him. Plaintiffs' Memorandum urges the Court to believe that Hepworth, who 
was arrested, by a policeman in uniform, was not restrained by force or threat of 
force. However, a person who has been arrested, must presume that he is held by 
force or threat of force. Hepworth does not support Plaintiffs' argument that 
whether Plaintiffs were restrained by force is a jury question because in the case at 
hand, the Plaintiffs were not arrested by a policeman in uniform. 
Hepworth relies upon the assumption that false arrest automatically gives 
rise to a presumption of false imprisonment. Hepworth at page 509 says: "False 
arrest is merely one means of committing a false imprisonment." 
In the case at hand, in order to establish a prima facie case, the Plaintiffs mus t 
demonstrate, as a matter of fact, that they were "unlawfully detained." According to 
the rule of law in Hepworth cited above, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they 
were restrained and deprived of liberty by force or the threat and a reasonable 
apprehension of force. 
The depositions of the Plaintiffs demonstrate that no Plaintiff was detained or 
restrained by force or the threat of force. When asked if anyone had locked the 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 21-22 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 22 
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doors so she could not leave or if anyone had used threatening words, Mazariegos' 
response was: "No."70 
Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action is for "Wrongful Detention"71 and in support 
thereof the Complaint alleges that Defendant Esquivel unlawfully detained the 
Plaintiffs. In the trial court's detailed Memorandum Decision, the court noted the 
fact that the doors remained unlocked. The court further noted that Plaintiffs had 
no evidence against Defendants of any threat or force to detain the Plaintiffs.72 
Plaintiffs had no evidence that "defendants substantially interfered with plaintiffs' 
liberty. Plaintiffs knew the location of an exit and made no attempt to leave."73 
The Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action is for "False Imprisonment"7 4 and in 
support thereof the Complaint alleges that Defendant Esquivel "unlawfully 
detained" the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' First and Fourth Causes of action against the 
Defendants, are one and the same. 
The only evidence provided to the trial court demonstrated that no force or 
threat of force was used and any of the Plaintiffs could have left at any time. The 
Trial Court observed: 
17. As to plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, false 
imprisonment, the Court again finds no evidence that plaintiffs were 
confined. Plaintiffs were aware of an exit, and plaintiffs were not 
physically restrained. Plaintiffs did not attempt to discover whether 
the door was locked and did not attempt to leave. The Court further 
finds that defendants did not falsely imprison plaintiffs by any threat of 
force. . . .75 
Plaintiffs argue that they chose not to leave the premises because they didn ' t 
want to lose their jobs.76 The argument made by Plaintiffs that they chose not to 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 28, lines 13-18 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 105, paras 15-17 
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, at R 692, para. 8 
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, at R 692, para. 15 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 104, paras 30-32 
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, at R 688, para. 17 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 12 
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leave, constitutes an admission that the Plaintiffs were free to leave, they simply 
chose not to leave. 
Plaintiffs did not have a prima facie case of wrongful detention or false 
imprisonment. The trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiffs' lacked the 
evidence required to establish the essential elements of a case of wrongful detention 
or false imprisonment and the two causes of action should have been dismissed. 
POINT 2 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ASSAULT 
AND PLAINTIFFS' THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BATTERY 
MUST BE DISMISSED. 
An "assault" requires a threat of force and bodily harm coupled with a wrongful act. 
In 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery §2, at pages 316-317, the definition of assault is 
as follows: 
An assault may be defined as any intentional, unlawful offer of 
corporal injury to another by force, or force unlawfully directed toward 
the person of another, under such circumstances as create a well 
founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with the apparent present 
ability to effectuate the attempt if not prevented. Also the term has 
been defined as an unlawful attempt, coupled with the present ability, 
to commit a violent injury on the person of another; an attempt or 
offer, with force or violence, to do a corporal hurt to another, whether 
from malice or wantonness, under such circumstances as denote, at the 
time, an intention to do it, coupled with a present ability to effectuate 
such intention. 
In State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937) the Utah Supreme Court, in 
accord with the foregoing definition stated: 
It is too elemental to require argument, that to point a loaded revolver 
at another to frighten or wound him constitutes an assault . . . . 
(Id. at 1132.) 
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To constitute an "assault" there must be a wrongful act. In 6A C.J.S. Assault 
& Battery §8, at pg. 328, citing the Utah case of Ganaway v. Salt Lake Dramatic 
Association, 17 Utah 37, 53 P. 830, the following comment is found: 
There can, however, be no assault or assault and battery wi thout 
a wrongful act. It is not every touching or laying on of hands that 
constitutes an assault and battery; to gently touch another for the 
purpose of doing a lawful act does not amount to an assault and 
battery; the touching of, or injury to, another must be done in an angry, 
revengeful, rude, or insolent manner so as to render the act unlawful. 
Similarly, an accidental hurt, in which the actor is blameless, does not 
amount to a battery. 
A cause of action for battery is based upon an allegation and the establishment 
of intent, malice, anger, etc. In 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery §8, at pg. 329 the 
following is found: 
Generally, intent is an essential element in an action for assault 
and battery. More precisely, it is the rule that intent is the gist of the 
action only where the battery was committed in the performance of an 
act not otherwise unlawful; or as it is sometimes stated, there is n o 
assault and battery unless the touching was with intent to injure, or 
unless defendant was otherwise engaged in a trespass or other 
unlawful transaction at the time of the act complained of. . . . 
There can, however, be no assault or assault and battery wi thout 
a wrongful act. . . . 
Utah is in accord with the common law cited above to the effect that there 
must be intent to injure or harm in order to constitute an assault or a battery. In 
Morgan v. Pistone. 25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a doctor who touched a minor, young lady neighbor, to emphasize his point of 
view was not guilty of an assault or battery. The Court stated: 
Plaintiff, a minor female at the time of the alleged terrifying touching, 
and an adult at time of the trial, said one thing, and defendant, an adult 
male, said another, i.e., that he touched simply to call attention by way 
of explanation that he, a doctor, disliked the degradation attendant on 
plaintiff's repeated suggestions that his role in society best could be 
described by the sound of a d u c k . . . . 
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On such highly emotional and controversial evidence the jury 
apparently believed the doctor was put upon with greater force and 
vigor, by the plaintiff's unkind, opprobrious epithets than was the 
plaintiff by the gentle touching designed only to warn, not to wound. 
Hence we cannot say that the jury erred in finding that there was not 
that kind of intentional touching amounting to a technical battery. 
(Id. at 839-840.) 
In the case at hand, Plaintiffs Complaint, Second Cause of Action for Assault 
does not allege a wrongful act or the threat of bodily harm or violence. The 
Complaint alleges: 
27. By requiring that all employees submit to a physical search 
of their person and belongings before being allowed to leave the 
premises, Mr. Esquivel intentionally created in all non-supervisory 
employees the reasonable apprehension of harmful or offensive 
touching.77 
Absent an allegation, supported by testimony or evidence that Defendant 
Esquivel engaged in any threats and/or acts of bodily harm or violence, the 
Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for assault must be dismissed. 
Plaintiff's Complaint, Third Cause of Action for Battery does not allege an 
intent to injure or harm. The Complaint alleges: 
29. By requiring all supervisors to physically search the 
person and property of all employees, Mr. Esquivel intentionally 
caused the harmful or offensive touching of all non-supervisory 
employees.78 
As to Plaintiffs cause of action for "battery," Mazariegos is the only Plaintiff 
who claims to have been touched. As to all the other Plaintiffs the cause of action 
for battery must be dismissed because they don't even claim to have been touched. 
Mazariegos testified in her deposition that she was in fact touched, but not in 
such a way as to cause harm or injury.79 The trial court observed: 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 103, para. 27 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 104, para. 21 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pgs. 20, lines 15-25 and page 21, lines 1-2 
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16. As to plaintiffs' second and third causes of action, assault 
and battery, the Court does not find any evidence that defendants 
threatened plaintiffs with any violence or harm. According to the 
Model Utah Jury Instructions, intention to cause harmful or offensive 
contact or imminent apprehensions of such is one of the elements of 
assault. See M.U.J.I. 10.18 (Assault Elements). The Court finds n o 
evidence that defendant Esquivel intended the search of plaintiffs to 
cause harmful or offensive contact, or to cause plaintiffs to be in 
imminent apprehension of such contact. In fact, the deposition 
testimony indicates that plaintiffs understood that defendant Esquivel 
intended the search to recover a fellow employee's stolen property. . . . 
The Court further finds no evidence that defendant Esquivel intended 
to cause acts of bodily harm or violence, and no evidence that Esquivel 
attempted to or threatened to cause injury or harm.80 
Absent an allegation, supported by testimony or evidence that Defendant 
Esquivel caused a touching of Mazariegos with an intent to injure or harm, or cause 
acts of bodily harm or violence, the Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action must be 
dismissed against her and all the other Plaintiffs. 
The trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiffs did not have 
evidence to establish the essential elements of a prima facie case of assault and 
battery. 
Having determined that no assault or battery could be established, it was not 
necessary for the trial court to consider whether Plaintiffs suffered damages. 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief cites Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 91. P.2d 
507 (Utah 1939) and Teppsen v. Tensen. 155 P.2d 429 (Utah 1916), as well as other 
cases/1 for the proposition that proof of damages is not required in order to recover 
nominal damages in assault and battery cases. Since no assault or battery was 
established by Plaintiffs, the matter never advanced to the issue of damages, and 
Plaintiffs' reliance upon the cases allowing nominal damages in assault and battery 
cases, is not well taken. 
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 689-688, para. 16 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 44-45 
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POINT NO. 3 
PLAINTIFFS GAVE THEIR CONSENT TO BE TOUCHED. AND 
CONSENT IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO A CLAIM OF ASSAULT 
AND BATTERY. AND PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES 
OF ACTION MUST BE DISMISSED. 
In 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery §16, at pgs. 337-338 the defense of consent is set 
forth as follows: 
It is a defense to an action for assault or an assault or battery that 
the injured party consented to, or participated in, the acts causing the 
injury, and such consent may be either express or implied. This is the 
rule at least in cases where life and limb are not exposed to serious 
danger in the common course of things, and where the damaged 
inflicted have not exceeded the bounds of the consent or invitation. . . . 
It is a general rule that one cannot maintain an action for a wrong occasioned 
by an act to which he has consented, under the familiar maxim "volenti non fit 
injurie," except where the act involves the life or person, or a breach of the peace, or 
amounts to a public offense.82 
According to the Restatement of Torts: 
(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be 
manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated 
to the actor. 
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be 
intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as 
effective as consent in fact.83 
In the case at hand, the sworn deposition testimony of the Plaintiffs was as 
follows: 
Santiago was not touched by anyone.84 But he was asked to take out his wallet 
and to empty his pockets.85 He testified the checking "was voluntary,"86 but he also 
82
 74 Am Jur 2d, Torts, §49 
83
 Restatement, Torts 2d §892 
84
 Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg. 33, lines 3 - 4 
85
 Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg. 32, lines 13-15 
86
 Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg. 35, lines 9-11 
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added he was concerned that if he didn't voluntarily consent to the check he might 
lose his job or others might think he took the money.87 
Bardales indicated he did not object to being searched and consented to the 
search. He stated: 
I had this coat on. I was wearing a coat. I opened it in the way 
that I had it opened so that he could see the pockets and tell that there 
wasn't anything there. 
I asked him if he wanted me to do anything else. I asked him if 
he wanted me to take off my shoes or anything else. He said, No, that 
was sufficient. Then I left, and the next person went in.88 
Mazariegos testified that when she was asked to raise her hand if she objected 
to the search, she did not raise her hand.89 She admitted that she was not touched 
with intent to injure or offend and stated that her supervisor (Cookie) only touched 
the bra and not her breasts.90 
Semidey testified that he along with everyone else went into the bathrooms 
voluntarily. 
Q. Did you ever see any forced used against any person to facilitate 
the search? 
A. (By the translator) No, because the men went into the men's 
bathroom and the women into the women's. We went in 
voluntarily.91 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief argues that whether a person gives their consent is 
a jury question and cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment.92 
However, the testimony of the Plaintiffs themselves indicates that they all 
outwardly demonstrated their consent to be checked or searched. The Trial Court 
stated: 
Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg 35, lines 9-11 
Exhibit 21, Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, dated April 21,1994, pg 40, lines 20-25 and pg 41, lines 1-2 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg 17, lines 14-17 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg 44, line 25 and pg 45, lines 1-3 
Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, pg 43, lines 3-7 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs 17-18 
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plaintiffs voluntarily remained and submitted to the search. Even if 
plaintiffs were afraid of losing their employment, they submitted to the 
search without objecting or without attempting to leave the premises.93 
Whether Plaintiffs inwardly resented the search or not, is not relevant. The 
fact is that no Plaintiff objected and each Plaintiff voluntarily consented to be 
searched. There is no evidence to the contrary. As a matter of uncontested, 
undisputed fact, Defendants have established their Defense of Consent and the 
Plaintiffs' Second and Third Causes of Action must be dismissed. 
POINT 4 
PLAINTIFFS' FIFTH AND SIXTH CAUSES OF A C T I O N -
INTENTIONAL AND RECKLESS INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS MUST BE DISMISSED 
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), the Utah Supreme 
Court established the rule of law concerning claims for emotional distress. The 
Court stated: 
Our study of the authorities, and of the arguments advanced, 
convinces us that, conceding such a cause of action may not be based 
upon mere negligence, the best considered view recognizes an action 
for severe emotional distress, though not accompanied by bodily 
impact or physical injury, where the defendant intentionally engaged 
in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting 
emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable person would have 
known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as 
to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against 
the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. This test 
seems to be a more realistic safeguard against false claims than to insist 
upon finding some other attendant tort, which may be of minor 
character, or fictional. 
(Id. at 347.) 
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685 
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Samms v. Eccles, goes so far as to say that even though a person's conduct 
may be extremely offensive to another person, that in and of itself is not sufficient to 
create a cause of action in Utah. In Samms v. Eccles the Court said: 
We quite agree with the idea that under usual circumstances the 
solicitation to sexual intercourse would not be actionable even though 
it may be offensive to the offeree. 
(Id. at 347.) 
The landmark case of Samms v. Eccles has been followed in numerous Utah 
cases. See Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 842 P.2d 
896 (1992). In Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), citing Samms v. Eccles. the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is well established in Utah that a cause of action for emotional 
distress may not be based upon mere negligence. . . . 
In the instant case, there is not so much as an allegation that 
defendants intended in any way to harm plaintiffs or any one of them. 
The summary judgment was therefore proper. [Emphasis added.] 
(Id. at 100.) 
In White v. Blackburn, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 787 P.2d 1315, (1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals stated: 
To support a cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, appellant must show the following elements: 
(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intent to 
cause, or the reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional 
distress; (3) severe emotional distress; and (4) an actual and proximate 
causal link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress. . . . 
(Id. at 21.) 
In Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 844 P.2d 
949 (1992), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
To sustain her claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, Retherford must show that (i) Gailey's, Randall's, Johnson's , 
and Bateson-Hough's conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it 
offended against the generally accepted standards of decency and 
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morality; (ii) they intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the 
likelihood of causing, emotional distress; (iii) Retherford suffered 
severe emotional distress; and (iv) their conduct proximately caused 
Retherford's emotional distress. . . . 
(Id. at 33.) 
In Sperber v. The Galigher Ash Company, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 747 P.2d 1025 
(1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Although Sperber does not allege that Galigher Ash Co. discharged 
him with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress upon him, he 
does assert that the company's conduct was "intentional, malicious and 
in reckless and wanton disregard of the effect of such conduc t . . . " or, in 
other words, that Galigher Ash knew that its conduct would cause 
emotional distress. To state a claim, however, a plaintiff mus t 
additionally allege conduct on the part of the defendant that is 
outrageous and intolerable to the extent that it offends societal 
standards of morality and decency. 
(Id. at 4.) 
In the case at hand the Plaintiffs Complaint alleges as follows: 
34. Defendant Esquivel's extreme and outrageous actions, in 
requiring every employee to submit to the indignity of a physical 
search, intentionally and recklessly inflicted upon the Plaintiffs in this 
action severe emotional distress. 
35. Defendant Esquivel knew, or should have known, that 
there was a reasonable likelihood that subjecting all employees to a 
physical search of their person and property would cause them severe 
emotional distress.94 
Intention to harm is a prerequisite under Reiser v. Lohner. Under the rule 
established in Reiser v. Lohner, the complaint must allege intentional conduct in 
order to state a claim for relief for severe emotional distress. In the alternative, if 
intention to harm is not alleged, the plaintiff must allege that any reasonable person 
would have known the conduct was "of such a nature as to be considered 
Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at R 102, paras 34 and 35 
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outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality."95 
Liability for emotional distress does not extend to mere insults, indignities, 
threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities. There is no occasion for 
the law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt.96 
In the case at hand, while the caption in the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action 
contains the word "INTENTIONAL," there is no language in the complaint which 
claims the conduct of Esquivel was intentional, intending to cause injury. 
Paragraph 27 clearly refers only to negligent conduct; and, under the rule in Samms 
v. Eccles and Reiser v. Lohner negligent conduct, even reckless negligent conduct is 
not sufficient to sustain a claim for emotional distress in Utah. There is no 
allegation in the complaint that the conduct was so "outrageous and intolerable" 
that it offended "against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." 
Plaintiffs cite Boies v. Raynor, 361 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961) for the proposition that a 
person's mental state constitutes admissible evidence of damages.97 However, Boies 
v. Raynor is not controlling Utah law, and does not impose upon the trial court, in 
the case at hand, a duty to hold that any mental suffering, fright, or shame, no 
matter how slight, constitutes a sufficient basis to require a trial court to submit 
Plaintiffs' claims to a jury. 
Taking the required elements of proof one at a time, as established in Whi te 
v. Blackburn: there was no evidence that Esquivel's conduct was "outrageous." 
There was no evidence that Esquivel acted with an intent to cause emotional 
distress. There was no evidence that Esquivel acted with "reckless disregard" of the 
probability of causing emotional distress. There was no evidence that Plaintiffs 
suffered "severe emotional distress." While the Plaintiffs, two years after the fact, 
95
 Samms v. Eccles, at page 347 
96
 Restatement, Torts 2d, Emotional Distress, Comment to §46 
97
 Plaintiffs Appellate Brief, pgs. 40-41 
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allege that as a direct result of the incident they all felt bad, there was no evidence 
that Esquivel's conduct was the proximate cause of severe emotional distress. 
Alternatively, if Plaintiffs had alleged, in their Amended Complaint, that 
Esquivel intended to harm the Plaintiffs and/or that Esquivel's conduct was so 
offensive that it was "against the standards of decency and morality," there wasn' t 
any evidence before the trial court to support either of the two alternative 
allegations, so as to create a factual question which needed to be resolved by a trial. 
Mazariegos testified that she knew the purpose of the checking was to find the 
money and that she was offended because of the inquiry, not because of Esquivel's 
conduct. Her testimony was as follows: 
Q. Do you believe that the purpose of the checking was to offend 
you as an individual person, solo? 
A. (By the translator) I think they wanted to know who had the 
money. 
Q. It's "yes" or "no." 
A. (By the translator) Both things, to offend and to find the money. 
If they check it's because they think they have the money. 
Q. The question is to offend—a plan to offend everyone or to 
offend only you. 
A. (By the translator) I don't know they were looking for money, 
and they check everybody, and that is what offends.98 
The deposition testimony of the Plaintiffs is not contested. As a matter of 
uncontested fact, the Plaintiffs admitted that Esquivel's conduct was motivated by a 
sincere desire to protect the employees from theft by their fellow employees; and, to 
recover stolen property for one of the employees. There was no testimony before 
the court which created an issue of fact as to whether Esquivel acted with an intent 
to harm or injure the Plaintiffs and/or that his conduct offended against the 
"standards of decency and morality." 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pg. 51, lines 22-25 and pg 52, lines 1-10 
31 
There was no admissible testimony or evidence before the court to 
demonstrate that Esquivel's conduct proximately caused severe emotional distress 
to one or more of the Plaintiffs. When the Plaintiffs were deposed, no Plaintiff 
claimed to have suffered severe emotional distress. Not one Plaintiff sought 
medical attention as a result of the incident. As a practical matter, Plaintiffs' 
deposition testimony described the incident as offensive, nothing more. 
A party cannot create an issue of fact by contradicting its own prior sworn deposition 
testimony. 
A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting or 
changing his own prior testimony. Camfield Tires, Inc., v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 
F.2d 1361 at 1365-1366 (8th Cir. 1983). In Van T. Tunkins & Associated, Inc. v. U.S. 
Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656 (8th Cir.) the Court stated: 
When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions 
which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that 
party cannot thereafter create such an issue with an affidavit that 
merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear 
test imony." 
In Essick v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 965 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1992), the court 
stated: 
In Babrocky, we held that "a party should not be allowed to create 
issues of credibility by contradicting his own earlier testimony. . . . In 
so holding, we noted that if we allowed a party to create a genuine issue 
of material fact by changing his own prior testimony: "the very purpose 
of the summary judgment motion—to weed out unfounded claims, 
special denials, and sham defenses—would be severely undercut." . . . 
We also noted that the plaintiff had not explained the contradiction or 
attempted to resolve the disparity.100 
99 Van T. Junkins & Associated, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, lnc.r 736-F.2d 656, at 657 (8th Cir.) 100
 Essick v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 965 F.3d 334 at 335 (7th Cir. 1992) 
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Stated another way, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the same long 
standing rule, "that Plaintiffs testimony is no stronger than its inconsistent 
weakness." Ross v. Olsen, 481 P.2d 675, at 676 (Utah 1971). 
The Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs affidavits for the reason 
that they contradicted Plaintiffs' prior sworn deposition testimony.101 The Motion 
was supported by a Memorandum.1 0 2 The trial court did not rule upon the Motion 
To Strike because, according to its ruling, Plaintiffs had failed to meet other 
preliminary requirements to establish a prima facie case. The trial court stated: 
...The Court will first address the issue of summary judgment and, if 
summary judgment is not appropriate, the Court will then address 
defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs' 
Affidavits.103 
After the depositions of the Plaintiffs were completed, and after Defendants 
filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs furnished affidavits in 
which they substantially modified their earlier deposition testimony, in an attempt 
to demonstrate that they suffered severe emotional injuries as a result of the 
incident. Examples of the contradictions created by the affidavits are as follows. 
Mazariegos testified in her deposition that she was angry, but not severely 
emotionally upset. She said she was mostly upset because soon after the incident 
she was without a job and couldn't sleep for that reason. She stated: 
Q. (By Mr. Martin) You came back to work the next day after the 
checking? 
A. (By the translator) I think so. I don't remember. 
Q. Were you angry the next time you came to work? 
Exhibit 16, Defendants' Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 
1995, R 630-629 
Exhibit 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits, filed April 26, 1995, R 628-618 
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685, at R 693, Para. 
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A. (By the translator) Yes. I was upset. I was feeling bad for about a 
month. 
Q. Feeling bad with anger? 
A. (By the translator) Yes. 
Q. Angry enough to break things? 
A. (By the translator) No. I never do that even if I am very angry. 
Q. Angry enough to hurt someone? 
A. (By the translator) No. I don't hurt anybody when I get angry. 
Q. Angry enough to yell at children or family? 
A. (By the translator) No. 
Q. Angry enough to stay awake all night or --
A. (By the translator) Yes. I stay several days without being able to 
sleep, but not because of anger. I was — I couldn't sleep because I 
didn't have work, a job.104 
The affidavit prepared after the deposition substantially modifies the earlier 
deposition testimony of Mazariegos and says: 
When I got home I was devastated. I had a bloody discharge that 
wasn't normal, but that was caused by my nerves and fear. I was 
almost hysterical. I couldn't sleep all night long. But even so, I didn't 
want to lose my job, and I returned to work, although I was very 
nervous and angry.105 
Mazariegos' Affidavit is countered by her sister's affidavit which indicates 
that Mazariegos had a pattern of being nervous and upset long before the incident. 
According to Esperanza Mazariegos' Affidavit: 
But while she was working at the stamps place, she would 
almost always arrive home angry and very nervous. She would also 
almost always come home with a headache. I noticed that she was 
extremely nervous, and I made her take linden tea to help her calm 
down. I also gave her massages almost every night, and rubbed Vick's 
vapor rub into her head so she would relax and calm down.106 
Exhibit 19, Deposition of Rosa Mazariegos, dated April, 19,1994, pgs. 48-49 
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 
23, 1995, R 604-544, at The Affidavit of Rosa Mazariegos, R 559 
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 
23, 1995, R 604-544, at Affidavit of Esperanza Mazareigos, R 551 
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According to another sister of Plaintiff Mazariegos, namely Matilde 
Mazariegos, the Plaintiff was always nervous and upset: 
But when she worked at the stamps place she would almost always 
arrive angry and very nervous. She would come home wi th 
headaches, and it was difficult for her to finish the things she had to do. 
She also began to act ebittered (sic) and sad. She would get angry with 
us, and many times she did not want to do her chores, nor eat.107 
The three Mazariegos' Affidavits demonstrate that Mazariegos was always 
upset and angry when she came home from work. The three affidavits, taken 
together, make it impossible for the Plaintiff Mazariegos to show that the incident in 
question was the proximate cause of her being upset, angry, etc. on the day of the 
incident, or for any period of time thereafter. 
Semidey testified in his deposition that he wasn't damaged by the incident. 
He said: 
Q. Now, maybe this sounds silly. It seems that from your 
explanation here today that as a result of this action you suffered 
no monetary loss. Is this true? 
A. (By the translator) Yes, right. 
Q. You were not damaged in any way except by feelings? 
A. (By the translator) That's right. 
Q. It also seems that you did not claim, other than your own fear, 
that there was any forced detention of any person. Is this true? 
A. (By the translator) For my own person? Only to my person? 
Q. Is that an answer? In other words — maybe we're not 
communicating. 
The sole reason for us being here is the feeling of offense as a 
result of this conduct, meaning the search incident. Is this true? 
A. (By the translator) Yes. 
Q. You were offended by the checking, true? 
A. (By the translator) Yes.108 
107 See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 
23, 1995, R 604-544 at the Affidavit of Matilde Mazariegos, R 550-549 
Exhibit 20, Deposition of Walter Semidey, dated April 21,1994, pgs. 58-60 
35 
In what appears to be a modification of his earlier deposition testimony, 
Semidey's Affidavit says: "I was upset, nervous and angry,"109 and "I felt very upset, 
very defensive, very aggressive. I continued this way for several days."110 
Santiago testified in his deposition that he had very little concern over the 
incident. He said: 
Q. Did anyone assault you? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anyone cause you to fear for your safety? 
A. No, no fear. 
Q. Did anyone cause you to believe that you would be harmed? 
A. No, I don't fear.111 
Q. (By Mr. Martin) If we can talk a moment about your emotions. 
Explain to me, if you can, the degree of your emotions which 
resulted from the checking. 
A. You mean when I was searched, when I was checked? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Just simply a person feels uncomfortable. 
Q. Anyone could understand this. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. did you become so concerned over a week that it caused you to 
lose sleep? 
A. The checking? No, I was fine with myself, with my own 
conscience.112 
In what appears to be a direct contradiction of his earlier deposition 
testimony, Santiago's Affidavit says: "I felt humiliated and offended."113 
Bardales testified in his deposition: 
Q. I think every person can understand, at least in this country, 
being very much offended by an extreme discourtesy, lack of 
courtesy. Did this, as you described, exceptional lack of courtesy, 
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 
23, 1995, R 604-544 , at the Affidavit of Walter Semidey, R 564 
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 
23, 1995, R 604-544 , at the Affidavit of Walter Semidey, R 563 
Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg 40, lines 1-7 
Exhibit 22, Deposition of Angel Santiago, dated April 20,1994, pg 45, lines 16-25 and pg 46,1-2 
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 
23, 1995, R 604-544, at the Affidavit of Angel Santiago, R 556 
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appear to you to be done with a purpose intending to inflict 
injury, mental or physical? 
A. (By the translator) I understand that not just the lack of courtesy, 
but I consider it an attack to the person. Personally, I felt 
emotionally very bad that whole day, an experience that never 
happened to me. Worse, I never thought that in this country 
that could happen to me. I've always tried to maintain my 
principles, and I've always been — and I've never had any 
problem. This is the first time that I find myself in this 
situation.114 
The Bardales' Affidavit prepared later greatly exaggerates the matter and adds 
substantial claims and says: 
This experience was one of the worst of my life. It left me very 
nervous and depressed. I got angry at my wife without any reason. I 
was very emotional and jittery for around a month after I left the 
company.115 
The affidavits of the Plaintiffs contain statements which are inconsistent with 
their previous deposition testimony. Even without that obvious defect, the 
affidavits of the Plaintiffs do no more than provide summaries of the state of mind 
of the Plaintiffs on the date of the incident, i.e. that they were offended and angry. 
But the affidavits do not demonstrate severe emotional distress proximately caused 
by the incident. 
As to the Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action, the Trial Court observed that 
Plaintiffs did not have the necessary testimony or evidence to establish a prima facie 
case of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, proximately caused by the 
incident in question. 
18. As to plaintiffs' fifth cause of action, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, the Model Utah Jury Instructions require the 
elements of outrageous conduct by defendants and an intention to 
cause emotional distress, or actions taken with reckless disregard of the 
Exhibit 21, Deposition of Jose Humberto Bardales, dated April 21,1994, pgs. 44-45 
See Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs' Amended Second Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 
23, 1995, R 604-544, at the Affidavit of Jose Humberto Bardales, R 553 
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probability of causing emotional distress. M.U.J.I. 22.1 (Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress). The Court does not find that 
defendants' conduct constituted outrageous conduct. Neither does the 
Court find any evidence that defendants intended to cause emotional 
distress or that defendants acted with reckless disregard of the 
probability of causing emotional distress.116 
As to the Plaintiffs' Sixth Cause of Action, the Trial Court observed: 
19. As to plaintiffs' sixth cause of action, reckless infliction of 
emotional distress, the Model Utah Jury Instructions find no liability 
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress absent a showing that 
defendants should have realized their conduct involved an 
unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress or that, if emotional 
distress were caused, illness or bodily harm might result. M.U.J.I. 22.5 
(Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress - Part I). The Court finds n o 
evidence that the search was conducted in a manner which would 
involve an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress or that any 
emotional distress might result in illness or bodily harm. Accordingly 
the Court does not find any reason why defendants should have 
realized that such results might occur.117 
Plaintiffs cite Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.. 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977) 
as support for their claims.118 However, Contreras is a case from Washington and is 
not controlling Utah case law. The "tort of outrage" has not been recognized in 
Utah, and Plaintiffs do not cite any Utah case law which recognizes the tort. 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint does not include a cause of action for the tort of 
"outrage." Contreras was a case involving aggravated circumstances and the cause 
of action was for the "tort of outrage" because the Plaintiffs were subjected to: 
continuous humiliation and embarrassment by reason of racial jokes, 
slurs and comments made in his presence. 
(Id. at 1174.) 
In addition, in Contreras, the Court concluded that Contreras was subjected to 
malicious and wrongful accusations of stealing property, and was subjected to public 
116
 Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, para. 18 
117
 Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, para. 19 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 27 
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scorn and ridicule which prevented Contreras from obtaining full-time 
employment. 
Plaintiffs cite Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985). Pentecost does 
not support Plaintiffs' position in the case at hand. In Pentecost the landlord 
forcibly removed the tenants belongings from the property, by "self-help," and 
refused to return them to the tenants. The court held the complaint stated a cause 
of action: 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. One who intentionally 
causes severe emotional distress to another through extreme and 
outrageous conduct is liable . . ..119 
Plaintiffs cite Matter Of Estate Of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah App. 1989). 
However, Gr imm holds against Plaintiffs position. In Gr imm, the court quoted, 
with approval, from the Restatement Of Torts and said: 
It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the 
defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and 
outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. 
Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the 
control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the 
conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in 
liability.120 
In Gr imm, the court continued to quote from the Restatement and said: 
The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that 
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and 
the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining 
its severity. . . . It is for the court to determine whether, on the 
evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to 
determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.121 
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, at 700 (Utah 1985) 
Matter of the Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, at 1246 (Utah App. 1989) 
(Id. at 1246.) 
39 
In the case at hand, the trial court indicated that Plaintiffs' testimony and 
evidence had not met the minimum threshold required to put the matter to a jury 
on the issue of severe emotional distress. In simple terms, Plaintiffs affidavits did 
not demonstrate the severity of emotional distress required by the Restatement Of 
Torts as quoted in Gr imm. 
Plaintiffs' complaint, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action for Intentional and 
Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress must be dismissed. 
POINT 5 
PLAINTIFFS' SEVENTH, EIGHTH, AND NINTH 
CAUSES OF ACTION MUST BE DISMISSED 
In 77 C J.S. Right of Privacy and Publicity §10, the following is found: 
The elements of the tort of invasion of privacy by means of 
intrusion and seclusion have been variously defined. The tort has 
been described as consisting of an invasion or interference by physical 
intrusion or some other form of investigation or examination, into a 
place where plaintiff has secluded himself, or into his private or secret 
concerns, that would be highly offensive to an ordinary, reasonable 
person. Other authorities have stated that the elements are intrusion, 
which may consist of watching, spying, prying, besetting, overhearing, 
or some other similar conduct, intrusion upon plaintiff which 
concerns those aspects of himself, his home, his family, his personal 
relationships, and his communications which one normally expects 
will be free from exposure to defendant, substantial and unreasonable 
intrusion, and an intentional act or course of conduct by defendant. 
Still other authorities have simply stated the elements of the tort as the 
existence of secret and private subject matter, the right in plaintiff to 
keep that subject matter private, and the obtainment by defendant of 
information about that subject matter through unreasonable means. 
In Cox v. Hatch, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 761 P.2d 556 (1988) the Utah Supreme 
Court examined the Restatement of Torts (1977) regarding the torts of invasion of 
privacy as follows: 
Invasion of privacy as a common law tort has evolved over the 
years into four separate torts. The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) 
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defines four different types of invasion of privacy. Section 652A of the 
Restatement states: 
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is 
subject to liability for resulting harm to the interests of 
another. 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion 
of another, as stated in §652B; or 
(b) appropriation of the other's name or 
likeness, as stated in §652C; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other 's 
private life, as stated in §652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other 
in a false light before the public, as stated in 
§652E. 
(Id. at 6.) 
In Cox v. Hatch, the Utah Supreme Court held that the publication of the 
photograph of a person with Senator Hatch did not constitute an invasion of 
privacy. The court stated: 
In sum, we hold that pictures of public officials and candidates for 
public office taken in public or semi-public places with persons who 
either pose with them or who inadvertently appear in such pictures 
may not be made the basis for an invasion of privacy or abuse of 
personal identity action. . . . 
(Id. at 6.) 
Plaintiffs cite Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah 
App. 1992) In Turner, the Utah Court recited the elements of an invasion of privacy 
as follows: 
To establish an invasion of privacy claim of intrusion u p o n 
seclusion, a complaining party must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence an intentional substantial intrusion, physically or otherwise, 
upon the solitude or seclusion of the complaining party that would be 
highly offensive to the reasonable person. . . ,122 
In Turner, footnote 5, on page 67, suggests that as to claims of personal 
intrusion, as opposed to claims of public disclosures, the appellate court would 
(Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, at 67 (Utah App. 1962) 
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require an invasion of the complainant's private residence. It does not appear as 
though Turner would consider a search of an employee at his public place of 
employment, to constitute an "intrusion into privacy" cause of action. 
Plaintiffs' Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action. 
In the case at hand, the Plaintiffs' complaint, Seventh and Eighth Causes of 
Action are based upon claims that the Defendant Esquivel caused the Plaintiffs' 
bodies and belongings to be searched, while they were at their place of employment. 
Neither of the two causes of action fall within the only available category, i.e. 
"unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another." 
Plaintiffs were asked to go to the men's and women's rest rooms, respectively 
and were searched. All the Plaintiffs describe the search as occurring in the rest 
rooms. The testimony as contained in the depositions of the Plaintiffs demonstrate 
that the only conduct complained of consisted of the search and/or offer to search 
the Plaintiffs while they were at their place of employment. There are no claims 
and no evidence of any attempt by Defendants to invade the Plaintiffs' personal 
residences, automobiles or anything which could be remotely considered to be a 
place of Plaintiffs' "seclusion." 
Even if Plaintiffs were to amend their complaint to state a cause of action, as 
recognized in Utah, the deposition testimony would not support a claim that 
Defendants' conduct is actionable. 
The Trial Court observed: 
20. As to plaintiffs' seventh and eighth causes of action, 
intrusion into physical privacy and intrusion into personal belongings, 
the Court does not find that the search, conducted at plaintiffs' place of 
employment, constituted an "unreasonable intrusion upon the 
seclusion of another." Restatement (Second) of Torts §652A(2)(a)(1977). 
Plaintiffs made no claims that defendants attempted to invade 
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plaintiffs' homes, automobiles, or other areas which could be 
considered places of seclusion for plaintiffs.123 
Plaintiffs' Seventh and Eight Causes of Action must be dismissed. 
Plaintiffs' Ninth Cause of Action. 
Plaintiffs' Ninth Cause of Action is based upon a claim that the Defendant 
Esquivel inquired into the religious affiliation of the Plaintiff Semidey and asked 
whether Semidey had a "valid temple recommend."124 Plaintiffs allege that such 
conduct constituted an "unwarranted, unnecessary, and wrongful intrusion into 
Plaintiffs Semidey's private affairs."125 
Again, referring to Cox v. Hatch and the Restatement, such conduct does not 
fall within the parameters of the common law tort of invasion of privacy recognized 
in Utah and in the Restatement. 
The Trial Court observed: 
21. As to plaintiffs' ninth cause of action, intrusion into 
personal affairs, this Court does not find this to fall within the 
parameters of the common law tort of invasion of privacy recognized 
in Utah and in the Restatement of Torts.126 
Since Plaintiffs' Ninth Cause of Action fails to state a claim for relief which is 
recognized in either Utah common law or in the Restatement, the complaint fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and it must be dismissed. 
POINT NO. 6 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT HAVE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THEY 
HAD SUFFERED SEVERE EMOTIONAL INTURY 
Rule 803(4), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides for the admission of certain 
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, as follows: 
123
 Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 687, para. 20 
124
 Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R107-99, at para 41 
125
 Exhibit 1, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint filed June 13,1994, R 107-99, at para 42 
126
 Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25,1995, R 696-685, at R 687, para. 21 
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Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and 
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or 
sensations, or the inception of general character of the cause of external 
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment. 
In order to qualify under Rule 803(4), the patient's statement must meet a two 
pronged foundational test: (1) is declarant's motive in making the statements 
consistent with a desire to promote treatment, and (2) is it reasonable for the 
physician to rely on the information in his diagnosis or treatment? Such 
foundational requirements are imposed to assure that the patient has a "strong 
motivation to be truthful." Roberts v. Hollocher. 664 F.2d 200, 204 (8th Cir. 1981), 
cited in Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial Commission Of Utah, 832 P.2d 
477 (Utah App. 1992); and Hansen v. Heath. 852 P.2d 977 (Utah 1993). 
Plaintiffs cite the earlier case of State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986) 
for the proposition that a psychological report prepared solely for purposes of 
litigation may be admissible in evidence.127 However, in Schreuder, the Court 
recognized that the "trial court tightly controlled Dr. Moench's testimony."128 
Furthermore, Schreuder stated: 
A psychiatrist or a psychologist of course cannot be made a 
conduit for testifying in court as to any and all out-of-court statements 
made. As with admission of evidence of any kind, great discretion is 
accorded the trial judge in the determination of admissibility. The trial 
court must, as with any evidence, assess the inherent reliability of the 
testimony, the relevance of the testimony, and undertake a balancing 
In the case at hand, the letter from the psychologist, Juan A. Mejia, 
demonstrates he examined the plaintiffs two years after the incident, not for the 
purposes of diagnosis and treatment, but for the purpose of providing testimony at 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 42-43 
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, at 1224 (Utah 1986) 
(Id. at 1225.) 
44 
trial. The letter is not in the form of an affidavit and it does not meet the minimum 
requirements imposed by Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. for the purposes of 
opposing a motion for summary judgment. 
The affidavit of Dr. Linda J. Gummow demonstrates that she did not meet 
with or examine any of the plaintiffs. The statements made in her affidavit are not 
based upon her personal knowledge, but instead are based upon hearsay statements 
provided to her. The trial court commented upon the lack of personal knowledge 
demonstrated in the affidavit, in the trial court's Memorandum Decision.130 The 
affidavit of Gummow does not meet the minimum requirements imposed by Rule 
56(e), Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. in that the affidavit is not based upon personal 
knowledge. 
As indicated earlier in this Brief, while Plaintiffs were angry or upset, they did 
not suffer "distress inflicted . . . so severe that no reasonable man could be expected 
to suffer it."131 The trial court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs had not met the 
minimum threshold requirement of demonstrating severe emotional distress so as 
to be entitled to present evidence of damages on the matter to a jury. 
The trial court was correct in ruling that the additional submittals from 
Plaintiffs consisting of the letter from Juan A. Mejia, and the affidavit of Dr. Linda J. 
Gummow did not meet the minimum requirements imposed by Rule 56(e), Utah 
Rules of Civ. Proc. Stated in simple terms, Plaintiffs did not have admissible 
testimony or evidence that Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress as a 
proximate result of the incident. 
Exhibit 6, Memorandum Decision filed May 25, 1995, R 696-685, at R 687, para. 23 
Matter of Estate Of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238,1246 (Utah App. 1989 
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POINT NO. 7 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO RAISE AN ISSUE OF A MATERIAL FACT 
WHICH PRECLUDED THE COURT FROM GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY TUDGMENT 
Rule 4-501(2)(b) Code of Judicial Administration provides in part as follows: 
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine 
issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separately numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and if applicable, shall state the 
numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's statement that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. [Emphasis 
added.] 
In the case at hand, Defendant's Memorandum complied with Rule 4-
501(2)(a) and set forth six pages of facts supported by reference to admissible 
testimony and evidence.132 As indicated previously in this Brief, Plaintiffs' 
statement of facts did not respond to Defendants' recitation of facts as required by 
Rule 4-501(2)(b),133 and Defendants' statement of facts must therefore be deemed 
admitted for the purposes of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In Plaintiffs' Brief on appeal, Plaintiffs make a misrepresentation to the Court 
and state: "Defendants did not submit any factual evidence of their own in support 
of their second Motion for Summary Judgment."134 Plaintiffs assertions that 
Defendants did not support their Motion with admissible testimony and evidence 
are without merit, and are directly contrary to the record in this case. 
Exhibit 11, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment - Failure to State Cause of 
Action, filed October 13, 1994, R 341-315 
See page 11 of this Brief 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 4 
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Plaintiffs' Brief on appeal contains a Statement Of Facts,135 but the facts are not 
supported by specific references to admissible testimony or evidence. Instead, 
Plaintiffs' Brief on appeal makes nothing more than a general reference to the 
depositions of the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs' own amended complaint, and Plaintiffs 
affidavits.136 Without a specific reference to support the individual factual 
statements made by Plaintiffs, it is not possible to verify that the factual claims are 
supported by admissible testimony or evidence. 
The Plaintiffs have not established that there were any genuine issues of 
material facts which precluded the trial court from granting a summary judgment to 
Defendants. 
POINT NO. 9 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED. IN PART. 
UPON THE PREMISE THAT PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT 
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
In Plaintiffs' Brief, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court weighed the evidence 
and ruled against Plaintiffs.137 However, Plaintiffs' characterization of the trial 
court's decision, is not accurate. Rather than weighing the evidence, the trial court 
concluded that Plaintiffs had not presented admissible testimony or evidence to 
establish certain required elements of proof, which Plaintiffs are required to 
establish in order to present a prima facie case. The trial court made numerous 
references to the Model Utah Jury Instructions for the purpose of demonstrating 
that certain essential factual elements would have to be established, as to each cause 
of action. 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 4-7 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pgs. 4-7 
Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, pg. 9 
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Since Plaintiffs' evidence did not demonstrate certain essential elements of 
proof, the trial court concluded the plaintiffs were not entitled to present their case 
to a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
THEREFORE, the Respondent requests that the decision of the trial court be 
sustained. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of ? ^ ^ r y , 1996. 
LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
^ ^ ^ 
D. Martin 
ney for Defendants/Respondents 
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